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MARRIED TO THE PAST: THE HIDDEN SPOUSAL-RAPE
EXCEPTION (AND OTHER ABSURDITIES) IN COLORADO’S
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
Colorado is unique among the states of the nation and not just for its
soaring peaks, excellent snow, and fit population. Colorado is unique in
its approach to determining who qualifies as a sexually violent predator
(SVP) for the purposes of the state’s sex offender program.1 Colorado
Revised Statutes section 18-3-414.5 defines a SVP as one who, among
other things, targets a victim who “was a stranger to the offender or a
person with whom the offender established or promoted a relationship
primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization”2 (the Relationship Provision). This emphasis on the relationship between the offender and the
victim is uncommon across the nation; indeed, it is only found in one
other state, North Carolina.3 In contrast, most states that designate offenders as SVPs do so only if the offender is psychologically predisposed
to offending again in the future and has committed a specific type of
crime.4
This paper argues that Colorado’s SVP statute improperly focuses
on the relationship between the offender and the victim. In particular,
wide-ranging research indicates that people who offend against partners
are also likely to offend against strangers. Thus, Colorado’s relationship
criteria ultimately serves as a meaningless screening process that operates in much the same way as the now rejected spousal-rape exception.
This paper further argues that even absent a focus on this hidden spousal
rape exception, the Relationship Provision itself—and the way the courts
in Colorado have interpreted it—leads to absurd results.
Part I of this paper provides background regarding Colorado’s SVP
statute. It discusses the way courts designated offenders as SVPs prior to
a seminal case, People v. Hunter.5 It also discusses the alternative ways
that some states use to decide whether a person is an SVP or not. Part II
introduces the facts of People v. Hunter and discusses its winding path
through the courts of Colorado. Part II also analyzes the majority’s reasoning, the holding’s effect on CRS section 18-3-414.5, and the dissent.
1. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-414.5 (2014); see also infra Appendix I, at 42.
2. § 18-3-414.5(a)(III).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.6(6) (2014).
4. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (2014).
5. 307 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2013) [hereinafter Hunter III]. For simplicity, the Court of Appeals
case of People v. Hunter will be called “Hunter II.” The Colorado Supreme Court case will be called
“Hunter III.”
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Part III evaluates People v. Hunter’s dramatic impact on future crimes
and SVP designations. Part IV considers some arguments of why
sex-offender registration statutes, including SVP registration statutes, are
improper. Finally, Part V argues that Colorado’s SVP statute is ineffectively written and absurd as the courts currently apply it. Part V discusses
wide-ranging research that shows a person who will offend in a relationship is at a high risk of re-offending again in the future—many times
against a stranger. Part V ultimately concludes that the Relationship Provision is an absurd requirement that, at best, reflects a continuation of the
archaic spousal-rape exception and, at worst, hinders the very purpose of
the statute—to put the public on notice of those most likely to re-offend
in the future.
I. BACKGROUND OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR DESIGNATIONS
Not all states provide for the designation of offenders as SVPs.
Among those that do, the majority focus on the crime committed and the
mental health of the offender.6 Colorado similarly requires that the offender commit a sexual offense prior to an SVP designation.7
The Colorado Legislature enacted Colorado Revised Statute section
18-3-414.5 in 1998. In enacting the statute, the Colorado legislature stated that, “persons who are convicted of offenses involving unlawful sexual behavior and who are identified as sexually violent predators pose a
high enough level of risk to the community that persons in the community should receive notification concerning the identity of these sexually
violent predators.”8
The statute is a protective rather than punitive statute.9 The effect of
the statute’s classification as a protective statute is that findings of an
offender’s SVP status are not subject to the burden of proof common in

6. See infra Appendix I at p. 42; see also infra note 7. It is worth noting that some statutes
have stretched sex-offender statutes to punish individuals who have never committed sexual offenses. See People v. Moi, 801 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 2005); see also Ofer Raban, Be They Fish
or Not Fish: The Fishy Registration of Nonsexual Offenders, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 497
(2007) (discussing defendant forced to register because kidnapping required sex-offender registration even absent sex offense).
7. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(II).
8. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-901 (2014). Interestingly, Colorado’s statute does not on its
face require the state to evaluate whether or not an offender has a mental abnormality that would
predispose the offender to future sexual assaults. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-414.5. This contrasts
with the approach of other states, some of which require evidence of a mental abnormality. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2014) (defining “Sexually Violent Person” as one who,
among other criteria, “[h]as a mental disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence.”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 2006) (defining “Sexually violent
predator” as a person who, among other criteria, “has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the
person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in
sexually violent criminal behavior.”). Nonetheless, the test is incorporated in an assessment required
by the statute. See infra p. 25 and note 16.
9. People v. Valencia, 257 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Colo. App. 2011) (citing People v. Tuffo, 209
P.3d 1226, 1231 (Colo. App. 2009) (“The SVP statute is protective rather than punitive.”).
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criminal cases.10 Instead, the state can satisfy its burden by a preponderance of the evidence.11
The power to designate an offender as an SVP resides with the trial
court.12 “The trial court designates an offender as an SVP when the offender: (1) was eighteen years of age or older as of the date of the offense; (2) was convicted of an enumerated offense; (3) committed the
offense against a victim who was a stranger or was a person with whom
the offender established or promoted a relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization; and (4) is likely to recidivate.”13 The risk of
recidivism is determined by Colorado’s Sex Offender Management
Board (SOMB).14
To determine if an offender is a high risk of recidivism, SOMB uses
a screening instrument to evaluate the risk the offender presents to the
community.15 The instrument evaluates the offender’s background, the
nature of the offender’s crime, the offender’s risk, and any mental abnormality’s the offender might possess.16 If the offender scores high on
the assessment scale SOMB should recommend that the court classify the
offender as a sexually violent predator.17 Although SOMB makes the
recommendation, trial courts are not prevented from deviating from the
recommendation.18 SOMB’s recommendation, however, is to be given
significant deference.19 SOMB’s determination of the risk of recidivism,
therefore, is not determinative of whether an offender will ultimately be
classified as an SVP.
Assuming the age criteria is satisfied,20 the two remaining criteria
are the type of offense the offender committed and the relationship that
exists between the offender and the victim.21 A variety of crimes are capable of satisfying the offense element of Colorado Revised Statute § 1810. Id. (“Accordingly, facts supporting a trial court’s ruling need not be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, as in all sentencing matters, a court may consider any reliable
evidence and is bound only by due process. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of facts relied
upon in sentencing determinations generally satisfies dues process considerations.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
11. Id.
12. See Allen v. People, 307 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Colo. 2013).
13. Id.; see also § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(I)-(IV).
14. See Allen, 307 P.3d at 1105.
15. Id.
16. Colorado Sex Offender Management Board, Colorado Sexually Violent Predator Assessment
Screening
Instrument
(SVPASI)
(2010),
available
at
http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/ORS2/pdf/docs/Risk%20Assessment/SVPASI%20form2010revisio
n051110b.doc.
17. Id.
18. Allen, 307 P.3d at 1104 (“[W]e hold that the trial court makes the ultimate SVP designation, but should give substantial deference to the scored Screening Instrument. A trial court that
deviates from the results of the scored Screening Instrument must make specific findings on the
record to demonstrate the necessity of the deviation.”).
19. Id.
20. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(I).
21. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(II), (III).
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3-414.5.22 There are not any surprises among the listed offenses: rape,23
sexual assault against a child (including coercing a child to reveal his or
herself),24 statutory rape,25 and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust26 are all capable of satisfying the statute’s crime element.
The final criterion that a court must evaluate prior to classifying an
offender as an SVP is the relationship, if any, between the offender and
the victim.27 The offender’s victim must have been “a stranger to the
offender or a person with whom the offender established or promoted a
relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.”28 This
Relationship Provision is almost entirely unique among the states; in
fact, most states ignore the relationship between the offender and the
victim and focus purely on the crime and the offender’s mental state.29
An offender “‘promoted a relationship’ if, excluding the offender's
behavior during the commission of the sexual assault that led to his conviction, he otherwise encouraged a person with whom he had a limited
relationship to enter into a broader relationship primarily for the purpose
of sexual victimization.”30 Similarly, an offender “‘established a relationship’ with his victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization
where he [or she] created, started, or began a relationship primarily for
that purpose.”31
Prior to People v. Hunter, the definition of stranger seemed obvious.32 The emphasis was on whether or not the offender and his or her
victim had a pre-existing relationship.33 Thus, an offender who attacked a
complete stranger on the street would satisfy the Relationship Provision
22. See § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(II).
23. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2014).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-404(1.5), (2) (2014).
25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405 (2014). It is interesting to note that while the statute would
readily designate an offender who committed statutory rape as a SVP, it would fail to do so to a
violent rapist like that found in People v. Valencia. Information regarding the offender in People v.
Valencia may be found later in this paper. See infra p. 31 & note 78. This paper does not assert that a
statutory rapist who promotes a relationship with a minor should not be designated as a SVP, but it
does assert that the rapist in Valencia is equally—if not more—deserving of that designation than the
statutory rapist.
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.3 (2014).
27. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III).
28. Id.
29. See supra note 6; see also Appendix I at p. 42.
30. People v. Gallegos, 307 P.3d 1096, 1098 (Colo. 2013).
31. Id. at 1097-98.
32. The Colorado Court of Appeals noted:
It is not difficult to understand how section 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(III) applies when the victim
is a stranger to the sex offender. Nor is it difficult to understand how it applies when, prior to an assault, an offender establishes a relationship with a stranger or an acquaintance
with whom the offender has no definable relationship and does so primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. The common element in these circumstances is evident: the
predatory offender sought and found a victim from individuals with whom he or she did
not have any definable relationship.
People v. Tixier, 207 P.3d 844, 847 (Colo. App. 2008).
33. See id.
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of the statute and be one-step closer to designation as a SVP. This approach drastically changed in 2013 when the Colorado Supreme Court
decided a case called People v. Hunter.
II. PEOPLE V. HUNTER: INTRODUCING STRANGENESS INTO “STRANGER”
People v. Hunter was a disturbing case. A mother and her five-yearold daughter were at home alone.34 The mother awoke to a complete
stranger who struck her in the face and then sexually assaulted her.35 He
then forced alcohol down her daughter’s throat and sexually assaulted
her as well.36 Throughout the assault the offender seemed to be a
stranger: he wore a disguise;37 he made reference to an unknown man
named “Carl”;38 he attacked at night while the mother was half-asleep;39
and he referenced the mother’s employment at a bank, employment
which did not, in fact, exist.40
It was only after the assault that the truth came out—the attacker
was a next-door neighbor who had spent time with the mother and her
daughter.41 His strange remarks about a bank and Carl were all a ruse in
an effort to cover his identity. He knew the mother and her daughter; he
had previously had dinner with the family, and on several occasions he
had helped bring in the groceries.42 Thus, the court was faced with a difficult decision—was the offender a stranger at the time of the attack? It
wound up being a difficult question, and the case wound its way through
the courts over the next several years.
A. Procedural History of People v. Hunter
The trial court concluded that the offender should be designated as a
SVP.43 The trial court’s determination, however, was appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals remanded the back to the trial court “because the
trial court had not made specific findings as to whether either victim was
a stranger to defendant or whether defendant had established or promoted
a relationship with either victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization . . . .”44
On remand the defendant argued that he was not a stranger to the
victims.45 The trial court once again concluded that the relationship be34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Hunter III, 307 P.3d at 1087.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Hunter, 240 P.3d 424, 425 (Colo. App. 2009) [hereinafter Hunter II].
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id.
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tween the offender and the victim satisfied Colorado Revised Statute
section 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III).46 Specifically, the trial court found that the
“defendant was a ‘stranger’ to the victims because while the assaults
were occurring neither victim was aware that the perpetrator was their
neighbor.”47
The offender once again appealed the trial court’s findings.48 The
Colorado Court of Appeals held that the trial court had misapplied the
statute.49 The court noted that a pre-existing relationship existed between
the victims and the offender: the “[d]efendant helped the mother carry in
groceries”; “both victims had dinner with the defendant in his trailer”;
the “[d]efendant had a nickname of the mother”; and the “defendant
stopped by the victims’ trailer to notify them that he and his wife were
planning to move to Missouri.”50
The court also noted that the prosecution had stressed the relationship in its closing arguments.51 The prosecution argued that the defendant’s knowledge of the victims, their living situation, and their dog allowed him to know “what he would be getting into if he entered their
trailer, whereas a stranger might worry about getting shot.”52 The prosecution also “argued that the reason defendant wore a mask in the course
of the offense was precisely because the victims knew him.”53 The court
noted that if it “were to apply the common parlance meaning of ‘sexual
predator’ to defendant, [it] might agree that the acts for which he was
convicted were predatory.”54
The court stated, however, that the Colorado Legislature had been
specific in its definition.55 Because there was an underlying relationship
between the offender and the victims, the court held that the relationship
criteria of the SVP statute could not be satisfied and thus the defendant
could not be labeled as an SVP.56
Judge Casebolt dissented from the majority’s opinion.57 Judge
Casebolt, emphasizing the horrifying nature of the crime,58 argued that
46. Id.
47. Id. at 424-25.
48. Id. at 424.
49. Id. at 426.
50. Id. at 425–26.
51. Id. at 426.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (“However, as noted above, in drafting this statute the General Assembly supplied a
precise definition of an SVP as one ‘[w]hose victim was a stranger to the offender.’”) (alteration in
original).
56. Id.
57. Id. (Casebolt, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (“According to the prosecution’s evidence at trial, defendant, while wearing a mask or
sock over his face to conceal his identity, broke into his neighbor’s home, and, for over three hours,
sexually assaulted her and her daughter (victims).”).
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within the context of the assault the offender was a “stranger” within the
definition of section 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III).59 Judge Casebolt further argued that regardless of whether the victim is a stranger to the offender or
the offender a stranger to the victim, the “danger to the public that the
offender may reoffend exists in both settings . . . .”60 Failure to apply the
statute this way, he argued, would potentially lead to absurd results.61
This point, in particular, is analyzed further in Part V.62
B. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT ANALYZES PEOPLE V. HUNTER
1) The Majority Opinion
The state appealed the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision.63 Justice Rice wrote the majority’s opinion.64 The task for Colorado’s Supreme Court was one primarily of statutory construction; what, in fact,
was the meaning of “stranger” under § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III)?
The majority began with the canons of construction and concluded
it did not have to go very far.65 Justice Rice concluded that the task was
an easy one:
Because the word “stranger” is not ambiguous, we begin and end our
analysis by considering the term’s plain meaning. In common parlance a stranger is an individual who is “a person not known or familiar to one.” Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word
stranger as “[o]ne not standing toward another in some relation implied in the context.” Given the importance of the context of any given interaction to the definition of “stranger,” we agree with Judge
Casebolt’s dissent and understand “stranger” to mean the relationship
is satisfied where either the victim is not known by the offender or
the offender is not known by the victim, at the time of the offense.
Moreover, defining “stranger” by considering the context of the parties’ relationship at the time of the offense is consistent with the
community safety and notice purpose of the SVP designation because
it ensures proper designation for offenders likely to reoffend in both
situations: where the victim is not known by the offender or the offender is not known by the victim.66

59. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III); Hunter II, 240 P.3d at 427.
60. Hunter II, 240 P.3d at 427–28.
61. Id. at 427.
62. See infra Part V, at p. 36.
63. Hunter III, 307 P.3d at 1085.
64. Id.
65. Justice Rice, quoting Colorado case law, wrote:
“In any statutory interpretation, our task is to determine and give effect to the intent of
the General Assembly.” We typically “afford the words of the statute their ordinary and
common meaning and construe the statutory provisions as a whole, giving effect to the
entirety of the statute.”
See id. at 1086 (internal citations omitted).
66. Id.
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Thus, Justice Rice concluded that it was not necessary to go beyond
the plain language of the statute.67 She also stated that her interpretation
was in line with SOMB’s, noting:
Similarly, the Sex Offense Management Board’s . . . risk assessment
screening instrument . . . defines “stranger” by considering the context of the victim and offender’s relationship at the time of the assault. Specifically, the Screening Instrument notes, “the victim is a
stranger to the offender when [the victim has] . . . little or no familiar
or personal knowledge of said offender.”68

With this perspective in mind the majority concluded that the offender in Hunter met the definition of a “stranger” within the context of
the statute.69 The offender disguised his identity, made statements about
“Carl” and the mother’s employment at a bank (employment that the
mother did not hold), and otherwise made himself a “stranger” within the
context of the assault.70
2) Justice Coats’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Coats concurred with the majority’s opinion.71 Justice
Coats’s concurring opinion was short, and its basis for concurring with
the majority appeared to be solely based on the outcome of their opinion.72 Justice Coats, however, had one main philosophical difference
with the majority. He wrote:
Because I believe the statute’s reference to “stranger” is best understood to include any sexual assault not facilitated or made possible by
the offender’s relationship with the victim, I would consider the requirements of subparagraph (III) satisfied by any break-in and forcible sexual assault, whether the victim could identify her assailant as
someone with whom she was acquainted or not.73

Thus, Justice Coats’s approach would have broadly expanded the
application of Colorado’s sexually violent predator statute. Justice
Coats’s concurring opinion agreed with the outcome of Hunter III but
not its interpretation of “stranger.”74

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The majority concluded:
In sum, neither victim knew Hunter was the person committing the assault. Thus, Hunter’s victims
were strangers at the time of the assault and he therefore meets the relationship criterion of the SVP
designation. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s designation of hunter as an
SVP.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1088 (Coats, J., concurring).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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3) The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Márquez authored a dissenting opinion and was joined by
Justice Boatright.75 Justice Márquez also looked to the plain meaning of
“stranger” but came to a conclusion contrary to the majority:
A “stranger” is “a person not known or familiar to one . . . or “a person or thing that is unknown or with whom one is unacquainted . . . .”
Thus, a person is a “stranger” if one lacks a general familiarity or acquaintance with that person. Importantly, whether a person is a
“stranger” does not depend on the circumstances of a particular interaction; rather, the term reflects the general lack of a relationship between two people. An existing relationship is not altered simply because a person’s perception is impaired in some way during an encounter. In other words, a person’s temporary inability to recognize a
friend or relative under certain circumstances (because it is dark, or
the person’s vision is obscured, for example) does not render that
friend or relative a “stranger.”76

Justice Márquez’s dissent did not dispute that the SVP designation
hinged on whether or not the victim know the assailant or the assailant
knew the victim.77 Instead, Justice Márquez disputed that the intent of the
statute was to focus on whether or not the assailant was a stranger to the
victim in the context of the events.78 Justice Márquez argued that the
interpretation should be whether there was an underlying relationship
regardless of the assault.79
Thus, the majority concluded that the context of the crime determines if someone is a stranger whereas the dissent concluded that circumstances outside of the assault were determinative of whether or not
the relationship element of the SVP statute was satisfied.80
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF PEOPLE V. HUNTER
People v. Hunter will have far-reaching consequences for criminal
defendants in Colorado. As the majority concludes, requiring courts to
perform the evaluation of “stranger” within the context of the assault will
expand the reach of the SVP statute to include defendants who previously would have eluded an SVP designation. This outcome, the majority
argued, would avoid absurd results. Simultaneously, the minority argued
the majority’s approach would lead to absurd results. It appears that both
may be correct.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. (Márquez, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1089. Justice Boatright joined the dissent. Id.
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A. Absurdity Avoided By The Majority’s Approach
The majority, quoting Judge Casebolt’s dissent in Hunter II,81 argued that its interpretation of “stranger” would avoid absurd results.82 As
an example of the majority’s view, consider a couple, X and Y, who separate. After the separation, X assaults Y while wearing a mask. Prior to
People v. Hunter, X might elude an SVP designation because a court
could conclude that an underlying relationship existed that precluded
stranger status.83 Even if X displayed the traits that indicate a high risk of
recidivism, a court might conclude that there was an underlying relationship between X and Y. Because of that conclusion, X would no longer
satisfy the relationship element and could not be designated as an SVP.
This is arguably the type of “absurd” outcome that concerned Judge
Casebolt and, later, that the majority in Hunter III intended to avoid.84
After Hunter III, however, a court could conclude that X was a
“stranger” within the meaning of the statute.
A result like that described above seems ideal. It is arguably absurd
for a masked attacker to elude a SVP designation simply because it turns
out he was the victim’s neighbor. Regardless of the relationship, a violent sexual offender represents a serious, ongoing threat to society.85 Further, the data indicates that an offender’s recidivism risk increases over
time.86
B. The Dissent’s Fear Regarding Absurd Results
The dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation of “stranger”
would result in absurd results.87 Justice Marquez noted that the intent of
the statute was to “identify that subset of high risk predators who warrant
community notification.”88 An offender that targets strangers, establishes
a relationship, or promotes a relationship purely for the purpose of a sexual assault is more “predatory”—at least in the eyes of the Legislature—
than one who targets someone he or she knows.89

81. Hunter II, 240 P.3d at 426 (Casebolt, J., dissenting).
82. Hunter III, 307 P.3d at 1085.
83. Note, however, that a court would also have to conclude that X had not established or
promoted the relationship for the purpose of a sexual assault. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3414.5(1)(a)(III) (2014).
84. Hunter II, 240 P.3d at 427.
85. See Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 157 (2010) (summarizing the recidivism rates of rapists and child molesters). The recidivism rate increases over time for
rapists. Id. Ultimately, after twenty-five years 39% of all rapists will face another charge. Id. 24% of
those charged will receive a new conviction. Id. It is important to note, however, that recidivism
rates are vulnerable to manipulation. See id. at 159 (discussing how different criteria resulted in
different recidivism calculations).
86. Id. at 157.
87. Hunter III, 307 P.3d at 1089.
88. Id.
89. Allen v. People, 307 P.3d 1102, 1110 (Colo. 2013) (Marquez, J., concurring) (“These
criteria [in the SVP statute] represent a legislative judgment as to which offenders qualify as ‘sexual-
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Justice Marquez, however, did not explain how the majority’s outcome might lead to absurd results. A few possibilities seem as though
they might be absurd. First, the actual events that occur during the assault
might lead to absurdity. As an example, what if the victim in Hunter III
had managed to tear the assailant’s disguise off prior to the actual assault? The offender would no longer be able to satisfy the “stranger”
definition set forth by the majority in Hunter III. Consequently, a victim
might actually spare his or her offender designation as an SVP if he or
she tears the mask off the offender prior to the assault.90
Likewise, other possibilities for absurdity exist. The legislative
judgment that an offender is only an SVP if he targets a stranger, promotes a relationship, or establishes a relationship for the purpose of sexual assault seems to completely disregard the possibility that some sexually violent predators might be as brazen as to feel no need for a disguise.
This exact situation occurred in People v. Valencia.91 In People v.
Valencia, an ex-boyfriend broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home.92 The details of the attack were particularly violent and included a sexual assault.93 The trial court concluded that the offender was a SVP within the
meaning of the statute and subsequently designated the offender as an
SVP.94 The offender appealed his designation to the Colorado Court of
Appeals.95
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the SVP designation.96 The
offender eluded a designation as an SVP because he was not a stranger to
the victim.97 Further, the offender had not promoted or established the
relationship for the purpose of the assault.98 Thus, he could not meet the
final element of the SVP statute.
Would anything end differently in Valencia after Hunter III? Arguably not; the offender knew the victim and did not disguise himself during the assault. This is one of the problems with the current SVP statute
in Colorado: violent offenders evade SVP designations in spite of the
ly violent predators,’ that is, those offenders who pose a sufficiently high risk to the community to
warrant active community notification.”).
90. The mere possibility that a victim might mitigate an offender’s SVP designation through
the active use of self-defense is, in this author’s view, the very epitome of absurdity.
91. People v. Valencia, 257 P.3d 1203, 1203 (Colo. App. 2011).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1204–05 (describing how the offender “stuck the knife down [the victim’s] throat”
and sexually assaulted her).
94. Id. at 1207.
95. Id. at 1204.
96. Id. at 1207.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1208 (“To promote a relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization,
an offender must engage in some conduct, beyond the sexual assault itself, which is designed to
establish an initial relationship or to expand an existing relationship into one primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.”).
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horrifying nature of their crimes. Sometimes, these offenders have been
intimately involved with the people they assault.
C. Absurdity Avoided By Neither Approach
A final absurdity exists that neither the majority nor the minority
approach can resolve—indeed, it is an absurdity that is imbued in the
statute. Intra-marital and intra-relationship rape is a significant problem
today.99 In these types of intimate attacks, the attacker is the spouse or
significant other of the victim. The problem with these cases is two-fold.
First, they can be incredibly difficult to prove.100 There is frequently a
pattern of abuse, and at least one Colorado deputy district attorney indicated juries are often skeptical of the allegations when the relationship
has continued beyond previous offenses.101 Second, even if a pattern of
abuse can be shown, a partner-offender will almost never satisfy the relationship requirement of the SVP statute.102 This is true even if there has
been a pattern of offenses over the years. This point is discussed further
in Part V.
IV. VIEWS OPPOSING SEX-OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTES
Until this point, this paper has not questioned the merits of any sexoffender registration statutes, including SVP statutes. Before going any
further, however, it is worth noting that sex-offender statutes, including
SVP statutes, do not have universal support in the legal community. Opposition to sex-offender registration statutes can fall into a variety of
categories. One broad and straightforward criticism of sex-offender registration statutes is that some studies suggest they have no actual effect
on public safety or sex-offender recidivism.103 Others focus on the impracticality of sex-offender registries as applied to specific offenders.104
Finally, some arguments focus on the basic unfairness—and the longterm stigma—associated with placing an offender on a public sex-

99. See The Wife Rape Fact Sheet, MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
https://mainweb-v.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/wiferape.shtml (last checked Nov. 24, 2014);
see also note 125 (citing study showing high rate of domestic violence re-offense).
100. I would like to thank Deputy District Attorney Brad Maloney for his insights into spousal
rape cases. Mr. Maloney indicated that rape cases involving partners are some of the most difficult to
prove. Often juries will look at the fact that the victim stayed with the offender and question the
veracity of the allegations.
101. Id.
102. The qualification “almost never” must be used on the off chance that an offender assaults
a partner in a way that renders the offender a stranger under People v. Hunter.
103. See, e.g., Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. &
ECON. 207 (2011) (arguing that sex offender registries are ineffective).
104. See Stephanie N.k. Robbins, Homelessness Among Sex Offenders: A Case for Restricted
Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 205 (2010) (discussing difficulty of homeless sex offenders compliance with Pennsylvania registration statute).
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offender registry. This argument has particular weight when the offenders are juveniles.105
The purpose of this paper is not to address and dismiss each of these
arguments; that said, they are worth considering briefly. Some scholars
argue that sex-offender registries do not perform a sufficiently valuable
social function in order to justify their existence.106 The argument asserts
that the statute is not justified absent evidence that the statute is preventing additional crimes.107 One of the fundamental problems with this approach is the thought that a warning, even if usually unsuccessful, is inand-of-itself not worth providing. Indeed, much of our legal system rests
on the premise that it is negligent not to provide warning to individuals
of known dangers.108 Yet another problem arises in regards to marital
rape. Studies suggest that marital rape is one of the most underreported
crimes in the nation, and offenders who offend against partners are at
significant risk of reoffending against current-and-future partners and,
critically, strangers.109 Indeed, at least one study suggests that upwards of
45% of offenders who assault those they know also assault strangers.110
These facts, of course, do not mean that the SVP statutes are perfect.
They do suggest, however, that state governments have legitimate reasons to provide for their existence.
Another broad category of criticism can be termed “offender specific.” Offender specific criticism can focus on the specific situation surrounding the offender, for example a homeless offender required to list a
physical address,111 or it can also focus on the offender’s life circumstances—for example, the fact that the offender is a minor.112 The first is
a legitimate concern regarding the execution of the legislation, but it is
not itself dispositive of whether or not sex-offender registries are worthwhile endeavors. The second is arguably quite persuasive—young offenders may be subject to lifelong registration requirements that will
impact every aspect of their lives.113 Again, however, these are specific
criticisms that, while worth considering, do not suggest that it is not
worth notifying the public that there are dangerous individuals who
might reoffend living nearby.
Ultimately, these criticisms are beyond the scope of this paper. In
Part V, this paper explores what a more relevant and effective SVP stat105. See Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration,
27 Dev. Mental Health L. 34 (2008) (discussing ongoing negative impacts to juvenile offenders).
106. See, e.g., Agan, supra note 103.
107. See id. at 208.
108. See, e.g., Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198, 202 (Colo. 2010) (discussing
failure to warn as negligence).
109. See infra Part V.
110. See infra at p. 36 & note 116.
111. See Robbins, supra note 104.
112. See Geer, supra note 105.
113. See id.
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ute would look like. In doing so, this paper does not intend to be dismissive of the criticisms leveled at sex-offender registries. Instead, it
focuses on a simple premise—if a state chooses to govern a specific area
of society, then it should endeavor to do so effectively and attempt to
avoid absurd outcomes.
V.TOWARDS A MORE SENSIBLE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR
STATUTE
The majority and the dissent in Hunter III were both correct: either
interpretation of the other could lead to absurd results. The majority’s
interpretation might result in an offender being saved the fate of a SVP
designation through his victim’s actions. The dissent’s interpretation
would nonetheless allow many sexually violent individuals to elude a
SVP designation. The inherent problem with Colorado’s Sexually Violent Predator statute is that absurdity is written directly into its text, and
neither the majority nor the minority approach can remedy that fact.
A. Colorado Revised Statute Section 18-3-414.5 Reflects Historic Beliefs
That Partners Could Not Rape Partners
One of the main problems with Colorado Revised Statute § 18-3414.5 is that it carries the assumption that two otherwise identical rapes
nonetheless represent different threats to society if, all other things held
the same, the offender did not know the victim.114 This represents a value
judgment that offenders who target strangers pose a higher risk to society; notably, this is very similar to the old notion that a spouse could not
sexually assault his or her significant other.
The problem with this approach is that statistical data does not support it. As an example, Colorado’s own training manual for the screening
tool used to identify SVPs disputes this assertion.115 In its training manual, Colorado’s SOMB notes the following statistics:
Significant heterogeneity exists in offending patterns based on sexual
history information obtained from Colorado prisoners and parolees:
45% of stranger rapists also assault people they know, and 68% of
offenders who were relatives of the victims offended against nonrelatives.116

Thus, although the legislature has made the judgment that an offender who targets a stranger, promoted a relationship, or established a
relationship for the purpose of sexual assault is more dangerous to society, SOMB’s own manual cites data coming to the opposite conclusion.
114.
115.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III) (2014).
See COLORADO SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT BOARD, HANDBOOK; SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR ASSESSMENT SCREENING INSTRUMENT FOR FELONS: BACKGROUND AND INSTRUCTION
37 (2003).
116. Id.
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Offenders who target people they know are also likely to target
strangers.117
While that statistic alone gives one reason to pause and consider the
reasoning behind the relationship element of the SVP statute, it does not
wholly dispense with the legislature’s inclusion of the provision. It may
be that, as Justice Marquez indicates, the relationship element represents
a legislative determination that offenders who target strangers—or who
establish or promote relationships for the purpose of a sexual assault—
are more deserving of an SVP designation. In such an instance, however,
the relationship element only acts as a moral filter; offenders who know
their victims are legislatively determined to be less culpable than those
who do not know their victim.
This “screening” effect mirrors another—and very similar—belief
about rape. Historically rape law defined rape as forcible sexual contact
between a male and a female. Further, the male was defined as someone
other than the female’s spouse.118 The definition implied that it was impossible for a husband to rape a wife thereby creating a spousal-rape
exception.119
Scholars have written a great deal regarding this historical exception. It has been asserted that the exception subjugated women and treated them as mere chattel.120 Similarly, the relationship element of Colorado’s SVP statute—intentionally or otherwise—represents a judgment
that (as an example) a husband who rapes his wife is not as predatory as
an offender who rapes a stranger. Indeed, it would seem impossible that a
husband might ever satisfy the Relationship Provision unless he wore a
disguise—a possibility that seems highly improbable in the typical case.
It is not difficult to perceive problems with this approach.
Marital rape is likely to be severely underreported.121 One study indicated that marital rape likely occurs twice as often as rape by a
117. See id.
118. See Emily R. Brown, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I Am Chattel(?!); Hear Me
Roar, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 657, 657 (1995).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 658.
121. The statistics offered are staggering:
Given the hidden nature of marital rape, it may be among the most difficult
domestic crimes to accurately assess. Many rape experts believe marital rape
may be the most underreported crime in the country, while one of the most
widespread. According to Rape in America, a report issued by the National
Victim Center (NVC) and the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center
(CVC), more than 61,000 women are raped by spouses or ex-spouses each
year in the United States. The CVC estimates that around 1.2 million women
have ever been victims of spousal rape. In a 1994 National Crime Victimization Survey, an estimated 36,000 rape and sexual assault victims of singleoffender victimizations identified a spouse or ex-spouse as the one who assaulted them.
R. BARRI FLOWERS, DOMESTIC CRIMES, FAMILY VIOLENCE AND CHILD ABUSE: A STUDY OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 84 (2000) (citations omitted).
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stranger.122 If offenders who assaulted partners were unlikely to assault
future partners, it may be rational to avoid labeling marital rapists as
SVPs.123 Offenders who commit domestic violence frequently also sexually assault their partners,124 and offenders who commit domestic violence are likely to recidivate.125 Additionally, offenders who commit
domestic violence are likely to commit violent acts against future partners.126
These facts mirror some of the same facts that are used to identify
SVPs. There is a significant relationship between offenders who commit
domestic violence and mental health disorders.127 This same relationship
exists regarding sex offenders.128 It is not clear, therefore, that offenders
who commit offenses against people who can easily identify them are
unlikely to commit the same offense against individuals in the future.
Although the SVP statute is not a criminal statute,129 it nonetheless
represents a legislative judgment that an offender who sexually assaults
someone he knows represents less of a threat to society than an offender
who sexually assaults a stranger. Although this may not represent the
same type of subjugation of women that the historic definition of rape
represents, it does represent a similar type of judgment. In effect, it asserts that raping someone you know does not represent the same type of
threat to society as raping a stranger.

122. Id. (“In using a conservative definition of rape, Diana Russell found that marital rape
occurred more than twice as often as rape committed by strangers.”) (citations omitted).
123. This paper does not assert that the conduct of a marital rapist is any less culpable than that
of a stranger rapist or that the harm is any less than the harm caused by stranger rape. To the contrary, there is some indication that victims of marital rape suffer even greater trauma than victims of
stranger rape. E.g., Louise McOrmond-Plummer, Considering the Differences: Intimate Partner
Violence in Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Discourse, CONNECTIONS, Summer 2008, at 5
(“There’s a common notion that [Intimate Sexual Partner Violence] doesn’t have as bad an impact as
sexual assault by a stranger. In fact, research reveals that the trauma can be longer lasting. Significant reasons for this are a lack of recognition and ability to share pain.”) (citations omitted).
124. See Flowers, supra note 121, at 37 (“There is a significant correlation between spousal
rape and other physical violence perpetrated against women by their spouses. One study estimated
that sexual assaults were reported by 33 to 46 percent of women who were physically battered by
their intimates.”) (citations omitted).
125. Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD.
71, 85 n.52 (1992) (citing study that offenders who commit domestic violence re-offend at a rate
“between 57% and 86%.”).
126. Id. at 85 (1992) (“[I]t appears that an abuser is likely to bring the violence with him to
each new romantic encounter.”).
127. See MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 12 (2d ed., 2008) (“A number of recent
studies have found a high incidence of psychopathology and personality disorders, most frequently
antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder (or post-traumatic stress disorder),
among men who assault their intimate partners.”) (citations omitted).
128. Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, What We Know and Don’t Know About Treating Adult
Sex Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE,
AND THERAPY 101, 112 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds., 2003) (“Psychopathy is an important predictor of recidivism among sex offenders, as it is among offenders more generally. Moreover, the combination of psychopathy and sexual deviance predicts especially poor outcome.”).
129. See supra note 9.
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This assertion does not mesh with the statistics that the SOMB relies upon in its training manual.130 Offenders who victimize those they
know are also likely to victimize people with whom they are not acquainted.131 These same offenders are unlikely to be labeled SVPs because they did not attack a stranger, did not establish the relationship for
the purpose of sexual assault, and—like Valencia—may not be found to
have promoted the relationship for the purpose of a sexual assault.
The Colorado legislature has written absurdity into the statute. Its
stated purpose is to identify high-risk offenders who pose an ongoing
risk to society.132 Due to its language, however, it then exempts vast
swathes of high-risk offenders from its reach.133 It seems that the only
judicial interpretation that would give the statute the full effect of the
legislature’s intent is that proposed by Justice Coats.134 Empowering the
statute to meet its stated purpose, however, requires significant judicial
activism. This is not a desirable alternative to a fully functional statute,
and courts are not empowered to ignore portions of statutes simply because they are illogical.135
B. Given the Choice Between Two Absurdities, Which Absurdity is Preferable?
As the previous section explored, Colorado’s Sexually Violent
Predator statute is rife with potentially absurd outcomes. In Hunter III,
the majority interpreted “stranger” to avoid one absurd outcome. With
that interpretation, however, the majority invited a new range of absurdities.136 The dissent, on the other hand, would have interpreted “stranger”
in a way understood by the public at large. The outcome would have
been the offender in Hunter III managing to elude a SVP designation
despite committing the type of crime that would seemingly warrant that
very designation. Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, could
ultimately avoid the absurdity that is imbued in the statute.
It is not surprising that the outcome was not unanimous given such
choices. Nonetheless, while the majority’s outcome properly designated
Hunter III’s offender as a SVP and furthered the statute’s intent to “iden130. See supra p.16 and note 116.
131. Id.
132. See Allen, 307 P.3d at 1110.
133. See § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III).
134. Justice Coats argued the stranger element would be met any time someone broke into a
house uninvited for the purpose of an assault. See supra p. 30. This would have been a very liberal
interpretation of the statute, but it may have some support from the legislature’s statutory interpretation statutes. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-212 (2014) (statutes are to be given liberally construed so
that the “true intent and meaning of the general assembly may be fully carried out.”).
135. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4-201 to 216 (2014).
136. One example is this hypothetical: Two identical rapes are committed. In one, however, the
victim managed to remove the mask prior to the assault and recognizes the assailant. As the victim
was able to identify the assailant prior to the assault, the possibility exists that—despite the identical
nature of the crimes—one results in an SVP designation while the other does not.
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tify that subset of high risk predators who warrant community notification,”137 this paper believes it was ultimately an outcome detrimental to
the people of Colorado.
Colorado’s SVP statute is imbued with absurdity. Whole swathes of
predators that represent an ongoing risk to future partners—partners who
will know the very person who is assaulting them—continue to elude a
SVP designation.138 The majority’s interpretation has done nothing to
change that reality. Instead, the majority’s interpretation resulted in an
outcome that—while just given the circumstances—avoided what could
potentially have been a public relations nightmare.
A public relations nightmare would have brought with it public
scrutiny of the statute itself. Public scrutiny, in conjunction with the absurd outcome that would have resulted from honoring the plain language
of the statute, would at least have had the potential to result in pressure
on the legislature to alter the statute itself. An outraged public would
have been more likely to pressure the legislature; instead, one wonders if
the public has even heard of People v. Hunter.
As it stands, Colorado Revised Statute section 18-3-414.5 continues
its existence without any public scrutiny. The interpretation in Hunter III
ensured a just result in the facts of that case, but it seems certain that
future cases will once again call the statute into scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Colorado’s SVP statute is fundamentally flawed. No amount of
tinkering by the courts can change its literal provisions; the Relationship
Provision is written into the statute, and as a result the statute is imbued
with absurdity. The way Colorado courts currently apply the statute is an
attempt to fix its innate flaws. Unfortunately, the solution brings its own
flaws with it. The actual events of an attack might dictate whether an
offender is designated an SVP. A victim who manages to rip off an attacker’s disguise only to discover that it is someone he or she knows
might very well spare the offender an SVP designation. On the other
hand, if the courts had not interpreted the statute in this way, then offenders who know their victims but wear disguises might never have
been able to receive an SVP designation.
Regardless, the current interpretation leaves vast swathes of dangerous offenders beyond the reach of the SVP statute. Offenders who assault
their significant others—married or otherwise—will almost certainly
never satisfy the Relationship Provision. The unfortunate reality is that
the failure of Colorado’s SVP statute to identify these dangerous individuals is just another hurdle to addressing the issue of marital and relation137.
138.

Hunter III, 307 P.3d at 1088.
See part V(A), supra at p. 36.
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ship-based sexual abuse. It is already difficult to convict these types of
offenders, and it is almost impossible to give dangerous relationshipbased offenders a label that might give proper warning to future targets.
Thus, the statute needs to be changed.
Colorado should join the vast majority of other states that ignore the
underlying relationship between offender and victim. Instead, Colorado
should remove the requirement and look at two things: first, the offense
that the offender has committed; second, the mental disposition of the
offender and the likelihood that he or she will re-offend again in the future. This two-part inquiry treats all offenders the same and avoids the
misconception that offenses against people that an offender knows is
somehow less culpable than offenses against complete strangers.
The various states of this nation long ago decided to abandon the illconceived notion that a person could not rape his or her spouse. This
action was not simply just; it was also an acknowledgment of equality
amongst the sexes. Colorado should now join the majority of the states
that have accepted that offenders who choose to target the people they
know are just as culpable—and just as dangerous—as offenders who
target strangers. Colorado should seek to execute legislation that is as
effective as it is fair; Colorado should eliminate the Relationship Provision from its SVP statute.
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